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Background: Research on cognitive control suggests an age-related decline in proactive control abilities whereas
reactive control seems to remain intact. However, the reason of the differential age effect on cognitive control
efficiency is still unclear. This study investigated the potential influence of fluid intelligence and processing speed
on the selective age-related decline in proactive control. Eighty young and 80 healthy older adults were included in
this study. The participants were submitted to a working memory recognition paradigm, assessing proactive and
reactive cognitive control by manipulating the interference level across items.
Results: Repeated measures ANOVAs and hierarchical linear regressions indicated that the ability to appropriately
use cognitive control processes during aging seems to be at least partially affected by the amount of available
cognitive resources (assessed by fluid intelligence and processing speed abilities).
Conclusions: This study highlights the potential role of cognitive resources on the selective age-related decline in
proactive control, suggesting the importance of a more exhaustive approach considering the confounding variables
during cognitive control assessment.
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Cognitive control is a fundamental aspect of cognition.
This ability is required to adjust and flexibly guide people’s
behavior in changing environmental circumstances, espe-
cially in situations where distracting information or a pre-
dominant response tendency must be ignored in order to
successfully act in a goal-oriented manner. The notion of
“cognitive control” can be conceived as a global term that
encompasses such well-known psychological concepts as
executive/attentional control, goal maintenance, top-down
processing, response selection and response inhibition.
Cognitive control was first highlighted by effects such as
the adaptation to conflict or the proportion congruence ([1]
for discussion of these effects). The adaptation to conflict
effect (the “Gratton effect”; [2]) refers to a decrease of the
interference effect for items following incongruent ones by
comparison to those following congruent ones, as well as
a slowing down of the processing of congruent events* Correspondence: f.collette@ulg.ac.be
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stated.following incongruent ones. The proportion congruence
effect reflects how task context can influence perform-
ance. Classically, this effect is investigated through para-
digms varying the amount of interference within a task (for
example; the Stroop task [3], the Eriksen flanker task [4],
the Simon task [1,5,6] or the probe recency task [7]) and
refers to the observation of smaller interference effects in
lists of stimuli including mainly incongruent items (low-
proportion-congruent condition) than in lists including
mainly congruent trials (high-proportion-congruent condi-
tion [8,9].
Several models of cognitive control have been proposed.
Among them, the information processing model [9,10]
suggests that interference produced by the simultaneous
processing of relevant and irrelevant response pathways
might be overcome by a “task demand unit” (correspond-
ing to top-down control) that favors the processing in
the appropriate pathway. The conflict monitoring theory
[11,12] refined that model by including the influence of task
context to explain interference effects. Indeed, the conflict
monitoring theory proposes that performance is continu-
ously adjusted during the task according to the amount of
conflict previously encountered. Finally, the importancel Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication
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action, goals, or task-relevant information) to overcome
predominant but inappropriate responses was stressed by
Kane and Engle [13].
In accordance with these models, Braver and colleagues
[14] developed a “context-processing” account to provide
an explanation of the previously observed age-related de-
cline in cognitive functions [15-19]. These authors defined
“context” as all internal task-relevant representations (based
on a particular previous stimulus, the processing of an
entire sequence of stimuli, specific task instructions, or
a particular goal) allowing to bias behavior to efficiently
respond to task demands. Consequently, context repre-
sentations may be particularly important to influence
cognitive processing. Braver et al. [14] argued that age-
related difficulties observed in working memory, inhibition,
attention and executive function may be in fact influenced
by the impairment of the ability to maintain context repre-
sentations in an active state. Following this theoretical
background, Braver and collaborators [20] also described a
general framework of cognitive control (“the Dual Mecha-
nisms of Control model”, DMC, see below for a detailed
presentation) that postulates the existence of two distinct
mechanisms: proactive and reactive control processes see
also [21,22]. In the present study, we were interested in in-
vestigating the potential age-related cognitive control de-
cline by distinguishing proactive and reactive control
processes. Indeed, the DMC account provides an elegant
framework to subtly assess individual differences in cogni-
tive control processes and complements the “context pro-
cessing theory” [13,14].
The Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) account
The Dual Mechanism of Control (DMC) account [20]
states that flexibility in cognitive control strategies may
be achieved through reactive or proactive control, de-
pending on situational demands or individual differences.
The DMC model clearly distinguishes these two kinds of
control in terms of cognitive properties and brain activity.
Proactive control is postulated to be a sustained form of
control that can be engaged in situations in which upcom-
ing stimuli can be anticipated, allowing for rapid and ef-
ficient responses. More specifically, proactive control
involves active maintenance of all task-relevant infor-
mation (i.e., task instructions, identity of previous stim-
uli, cues for later behavior, etc.) that could be useful to
produce an appropriate response to cognitively demand-
ing events. Reactive control, on the other hand, is thought
to be engaged in situations in which anticipating the char-
acteristics of upcoming stimuli is not the most efficient
way to perform the task. In that case, the occurrence of
a critical event triggers the transient reactivation of re-
quired information, specifically in response to that crit-
ical stimulus. In sum, proactive control mechanisms arespecialized in anticipating and preventing interference,
whereas reactive control is dedicated to detecting and
resolving interference whenever it occurs [21].
As mentioned earlier, an important factor that may
modulate the extent to which proactive or reactive strat-
egies contribute to task performance is the overall task
context (i.e., task demands and characteristics). Indeed,
although both strategies are equally likely to lead to cor-
rect performance on a specific trial, there are some situ-
ations in which one or the other kind of control is most
appropriate, and the task context encourages the adop-
tion of one form of control over the other. Among these
factors, conditions involving high interference levels and
allowing the anticipation of interference should encour-
age the use of proactive control whereas situations in
which interference is infrequent and unexpected, react-
ive control mechanisms are predicted to dominate [20].
Recent data supporting that distinction between pro-
active and reactive cognitive control have notably been
obtained with the Stroop and the probe recency tasks.
For example, Bélanger et al. [3] investigated these two
processes by manipulating proportions of congruent items
within a Stroop task. The comparison of performance be-
tween congruent and incongruent trials within the mostly
congruent condition was assumed to reflect interference
resolution abilities or the involvement of reactive control
processes while the comparison of performance between
incongruent trials of the mostly congruent and the mostly
incongruent conditions was supposed to reflect the contri-
bution of proactive control by the involvement of goal
maintenance abilities. As suggested by the DMC model,
Bélanger et al. [3] observed that young participants were
slower and less accurate for incongruent trials than congru-
ent ones in the mostly congruent condition. Moreover, they
were also slower and less accurate for the incongruent trials
that occurred during the mostly congruent condition than
for the ones presented in the mostly incongruent condition.
The implementation of proactive and reactive control
processes was also investigated by Burgess and Braver
[7] using the Sternberg probe recency task [23]. In this
task, sets of items are presented, followed after a brief
delay by a single probe item. Participants have to indi-
cate whether the probe item was part of the memory set
(positive probe) or not (negative probe). However, in some
trials, the probe was also “recent,” meaning that it had been
presented during the memory set in the prior trial, leading
to a higher degree of interference in the current trial. As
expected, Burgess and Braver ([7], pilot study) observed
that the interference associated with negative probes (more
errors and slower response times) tended to be lower in
the high- than in the low-interference expectancy con-
dition, indicating the recruitment of proactive control
processes to efficiently cope with a high-interference
context.
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important factor that likely influence the selection of a
control strategy is individual differences in cognitive
abilities. Because proactive control is more resource-
demanding, the implementation of such control when
required by task characteristics will be more efficient for
individuals who have more cognitive resources available.
In fact, impairment in cognitive control previously re-
ported in pathological or developmental populations (e.g.,
individuals with schizophrenia, older adults, etc.) might
stem from differential reliance on reactive and proactive
control processes. Consequently, the influence of three
factors (age, level of fluid intelligence and processing
speed) on the selection of these strategies will be investi-
gated in the present study.
Fluid intelligence, processing speed and cognitive control
Fluid intelligence and cognitive control
As mentioned above, proactive control is considered to
engage more cognitive resources than reactive control
[20]. The concept of cognitive resources was previously
linked to the constructs of working memory capacity
and fluid intelligence (i.e., reasoning and problem solving
abilities), and it was assumed that these two cognitive com-
ponents could favor the ability to maintain goal-relevant
information in an interfering context [13,24]. Thus it seems
relevant to assume that individuals with high fluid intel-
ligence should be more disposed to use proactive control
to maintain task-goals in an active state in order to more
efficiently manage the deleterious effect of interference. In
accordance with this assumption, Perfetti, Tesse, Varanese,
Saggino, and Onofrj [25] investigated the potential link be-
tween fluid intelligence and a cognitive bias occurring with
task–irrelevant characteristics of a salient stimulus. In their
study, Perfetti et al. [25] used a three-back working mem-
ory task in which continuous sequences of stimuli were
presented to participants. Two versions of the task were
used to assess “cross-domain biasing effects”. In the letter-
detection version, participants were explicitly asked to re-
tain and match the stimuli on the basis of their identity
(letters), whereas they had to match stimuli according to
their position for the spatial version of the task. Target and
non-target trials were manipulated to introduce lures and
create facilitating and interfering effects respectively. In
other words, to measure “cross-domain biasing effects”,
some trials involved a stimulus that matched the three-back
items on the other task-domain than that requested for the
response. As expected, Perfetti et al. [25] found that signifi-
cant interference effects occurred for non-target stimuli fol-
lowing a three-back item matching the irrelevant domain.
Moreover, they showed that fluid intelligence (assessed by
the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices [26]) could in-
fluence the ability to manage these interference effects
across distinct domains. The authors suggested that theexplicit instruction given to participants to focus on the
task-relevant domain (letter-detection vs. spatial task) might
have induced the use of proactive control strategy, allowing
to improve goal representations maintenance in working
memory to prevent interference effects, and this more par-
ticularly in the group with high fluid intelligence level.
In their 2010 study, Burgess and Braver [7] observed that
young adults with high fluid intelligence levels were less
sensitive to interference than low-level participants. How-
ever, this decreased interference effect was limited to the
high-interference condition, in which proactive control
is thought to be involved. Thus, this study also provided
some evidence supporting the notion that individuals with
high fluid intelligence levels tend to increase the use of the
proactive control strategy in high-interference conditions.
Processing speed and cognitive control
Despite the absence of studies that directly investigate
the impact of processing speed on cognitive control effi-
ciency, several authors have suggested that there exists
a relationship between fluid intelligence and processing
speed [27-31], and also with working memory (for a re-
view, [32]). For instance, Jensen [33] suggested that indi-
vidual differences in working memory could underlie the
correlation between speed and intelligence. Indeed, as
information needed for reasoning and problem solving is
temporarily stored in working memory, faster processing
speed allows the completion of these processes before
the loss of this information, leading to better perform-
ance. Accordingly, working memory was found to be
correlated with reasoning abilities and processing speed
in a series of experiment [34].
These data clearly showed a relationship between indi-
vidual differences in processing speed, working memory
and fluid intelligence in young adults. Moreover, other
studies have indicated that working memory [13,35,36] and
fluid intelligence [7,24] could influence proactive control
abilities. Consequently, it seems relevant to explore the po-
tential impact of processing speed and/or fluid intelligence
on the tendency to efficiently select the most appropriate
control strategy to perform a task, and more generally, the
impact of these variables (considered to reflect the amount
of available cognitive resources) on the selective age-
related decline suggested in proactive control.
Aging and cognitive control
Age-related cognitive changes appear particularly pro-
nounced in tasks that require a high degree of cognitive
control, such as when attention must be endogenously
and intensively focused, especially in the face of distrac-
tion and interference, as well as in cognitive situations that
demand a large amount of attentional resources for a re-
view, see [37]. Accordingly, a series of studies from Braver
and colleagues showed a selective age-related impairment
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strategy seems to remain intact [14,38,39].
Changes in cognitive control strategy in healthy older
adults were notably investigated with the AX-CPT task
([38]; see also [14,39]. The classical AX-CPT paradigm
requires participants to respond as quickly and accurately
as possible to a specific target occurring after a specific
cue. Target trials, which constitute 70% of the task, involve
the occurrence of an A letter as the cue followed by an X
letter as the target and require a positive response. Three
kinds of non-target trials (10% each, for a total of 30%
of the task), which require negative responses, involve (1)
an invalid cue (non-A letter) preceding the X target (BX
trials); (2) a valid cue (A letter) followed by an invalid
“non-X” target (AY trials); and (3) an invalid cue (non-A
letter) followed by an invalid “non-X” target (BY trials).
With this task, Braver et al. [38] observed that older adults
were more accurate than younger ones in the AY condi-
tion but the two groups of participants did not differ for
BX and BY trials. Moreover, older adults were less dis-
turbed by the A probe in non-target trials (smaller differ-
ence in reaction times [RTs] between AY and BY trials
than in the young group). In contrast, older adults showed
greater interference effects for the X probe (larger dif-
ference in RTs between BX and BY trials). These results
suggest that older adults showed impairments affecting
context representations and updating inasmuch as they
had poorer BX performance (slower RTs but intact ac-
curacy) and better AY performance (greater accuracy)
than younger adults. Given that reactive control is de-
fined as a transient reactivation of context representa-
tions following the occurrence of the probe, it may be
assumed that older adults tended to rely on this kind of
cognitive control because of their high accuracy on BX
trials, which suggests that their access to context repre-
sentations is spared, and their slower RTs on BX trials,
suggesting that these context representations were re-
activated when the probe occurred. Therefore, Braver
et al. [38] proposed that there is an age-related impairment
in the tendency to use proactive control to correctly pre-
pare attentional mechanisms to process upcoming probe
stimuli. This assumption seems to be supported by the
enhanced age-related performance on AY trials, which
could be interpreted as an age-related decline in the use
of context representations to anticipate the probe (pro-
active control).
Thus, empirical evidence reveals an age-related decline
in proactive control abilities. However, to our knowledge,
no study has directly tested, in the context of the DMC
framework, the hypothesis that the age-related decrease in
proactive control abilities could in fact be influenced by the
existence of less efficient general cognitive processes (such
as processing speed and fluid intelligence). Answering this
question should improve our understanding of cognitivecontrol and the variations occurring on these mechanisms
with age.
Objectives of the study
Given the dynamic relationship between cognitive control,
fluid intelligence and processing speed, as well as the age-
related changes in these cognitive domains, the objective
of this study was to explore the possible impact of fluid
intelligence level and processing speed on the decline of
proactive control abilities in healthy aging. Using a modified
Sternberg paradigm [23], proactive and reactive control
abilities were compared in young and older participants
using three approaches: (1) an initial large sample of
participants; (2) a subsample of young and older partici-
pants matched for fluid intelligence level; and (3) another
subsample of young and older participants matched for
processing speed. We hypothesized that a decrease in pro-
active control abilities would be observed in the initial sam-
ple but that no difference in performance would emerge
when the influence of any age-related decline in fluid in-
telligence and processing speed was controlled. In order to
extend results from the first analyses, hierarchical linear re-
gressions were performed on the whole sample of partici-
pants’ scores in the high interference condition, using age,




Eighty young (43 men; M age = 22.1 years; SD = 2.8;
range = 18–29) and 80 healthy older adults (37 men; M =
74.1 years; SD = 7.8; range = 60–89) were included in this
study. Informed written consent was obtained from each
participant; the study was approved by the Ethics Com-
mittee of the Faculty of Psychology of the University of
Liège, and was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards described in the Declaration of Helsinki (1964).
All participants had normal or corrected vision and hear-
ing, were native French speakers and none reported any
medical, neurological or sensory defects, or use of medica-
tion likely to alter cognitive functioning. The cognitive sta-
tus of the older participants was checked with the Mattis
Dementia Rating Scale [40] (see Table 1). All older partici-
pants had a total score equal to or greater than 130 (range
130–144), which constitutes the cut-off score to distin-
guish between healthy aging and dementia [41]. The
young and older groups of participants differed in terms
of educational level (t (158) = −2.014; p < .05) and vocabu-
lary level on the French adaptation of the Mill Hill test
[42] (t (158) = −8.342; p < .001) (see Table 1).
Materials and procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet, well-lit
room. The two conditions of the probe recency Sternberg
Table 1 Demographic and cognitive information for the





Gender ratio [male/female] 43/37 37/43
Educational level [years completed] 13.57 ± 2.28 14.5 ± 3.42
Mill Hill [Crystallized intelligence] 21.3 ± 5.09 27.5 ± 4.27
Raven’s advanced progressive
matrices [Fluid intelligence]
52.85 ± 5.25 43.96 ± 7.74
Code test (WAIS-III) [Processing speed] 85.23 ± 12.68 57.64 ± 12.99
Mattis dementia rating scale 140.262 ± 0.291
Mean raw score ± standard deviation.
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color monitor using E-Prime software version 1.1, Service
pack 3 [43]. Fluid intelligence and processing speed were
respectively assessed by the paper-pencil version of the
Raven’s Advanced Standard Progressive Matrices [44] and
the Code task from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS-III; [45]). For the probe recency task, participants
were seated in front of the computer screen at approxi-
mately 50 cm from the display. Response keys were lo-
cated on a standard AZERTY keyboard.
The order of task administration was counterbalanced
across participants such that half of the participants per-
formed the high-interference condition of the probe re-
cency task before the low-interference condition and the
other half performed first the low-interference condition.
Student t-tests performed on RTs and accuracy scores in
the high- and low-interference conditions revealed no
significant difference between the two orders of task ad-
ministration, neither in the young nor in the older adults
group (all ps > .05).
Tasks
Fluid intelligence
All participants performed the Raven’s Advanced Pro-
gressive Matrices [44] (see Table 1). In this 60-item non-
verbal reasoning test, each item contains a pattern with
a missing piece. The subject has to infer the rules under-
lying the pattern and apply these rules to discover which
of the answer options provides the correct completion.
Completion was self-paced. The score obtained is as-
sumed to provide a reliable measure of reasoning and fluid
intelligence level.
Processing speed
Participants also performed the Code test from the
WAIS-III [45]. This task requires participants to write,
as quickly and accurately as possible, the corresponding
numbers in front of symbols with the help of a corres-
pondence table (see Table 1). The score obtained is
thought to reveal basic processing speed abilities.The probe recency task
Cognitive control was assessed by an adapted Sternberg’s
[23] item-recognition short-term memory task. Partici-
pants were presented series of trials consisting in groups
of four consonants (target groups). They had to maintain
these items in memory for a short retention interval,
after which they were given a single probe item and had
to decide whether this probe matched one of the items
previously presented in the target group. The time course
of a trial was as follows (see Figure 1): First, a fixation
cross was displayed for 500 ms, followed by the visual
presentation of the group of four consonants for 1500 ms.
A blank screen was then displayed for 3000 ms, followed
by the probe letter. The probe letter remained on the
screen until the response was given, with a maximum re-
sponse time allowed of 15 s. Finally, a blank screen was
presented again for 1000 ms before the beginning of the
next trial. Participants had to indicate, as quickly and ac-
curately as possible, by pressing one of two response keys,
whether the probe letter was present or not in the four-
letter target group of the current trial.
There were four trial types (illustrated in Figure 1) de-
fined by the nature of the probe: (1) recent negative trials,
for which the probe did not match any items from the
current target set (and thus required a “no” response),
but did match an item from the two previous target sets;
(2) non-recent negative trials, for which the probe did
not match any item from the current target set (and thus
required a “no” response) nor the two previous target sets;
(3) recent positive trials, for which the probe matched an
item that was presented in the current target set (and thus
required a “yes” response) and also in the two previous
target sets; (4) non-recent positive trials, for which the
probe matched an item that was presented in the current
target set (and thus required a “yes” response) but not in
the two previous target sets. Recent negative trials consti-
tuted the interfering trials, and recent positive trials the
facilitating trials. Non-recent negative and positive trials
represent control trials, used to calculate interference and
facilitation effects respectively (see below). In the present
study, only interference effects will be discussed.
To manipulate the recruitment of proactive and react-
ive control processes, two versions of the probe recency
task were created by varying the ratio of recent positive
and recent negative trials in each version (see Table 2 for
items distribution). Indeed, according to Braver, Gray, &
Burgess [20], a high probability of encountering interfering
items (here, recent negative items) across trials should
favor the employment of a proactive control strategy,
whereas a low probability of interference should favor re-
active control. Consequently, the low-interference condi-
tion was composed of 40% recent positive trials and 10%
recent negative trials while the reverse proportion (40%
recent negative and 10% recent positive) was presented in
Figure 1 Task conditions of the Sternberg paradigm. The four task conditions determined by the nature of the probe items. (1) Recent
negative condition: The probe did not match any items of the current target set but had occurred in both previous trials; (2) Non-recent negative
condition: The probe did not match any items of the current target set or of the two previous trials; (3) Recent positive condition: The probe
matched an item of the current target set and had occurred in both previous trials; (4) Non-recent positive condition: The probe matched an item
of the current target set but had not occurred in the two previous trials.
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recent positive and non-recent negative (neutral items)
was 25% in each condition.
Results
All analyses were conducted with a statistical threshold set
at p < .05. In order to meet the assumptions of homogen-
eity of variances and normality, statistical analyses were
performed on logarithmic transformed RTs and arcsine
transformed accuracy scores. Nevertheless, for the sake of
clarity, figures were created using the means of the raw
values. An interference index was calculated by subtractingTable 2 Composition of the low- and the
high-interference conditions




[Reactive Control] [Proactive Control]
Recent positive 40% (32) 10% (8)
Recent negative 10% (8) 40% (32)
Non-recent positive 25% (20) 25% (20)
Non-recent negative 25% (20) 25% (20)
Distribution of the probe items in the two parts of the probe recency task
(Raw number of trials).RTs for non-recent negative stimuli (“neutral stimuli”) from
recent negative stimuli (“interfering stimuli”) in both high-
and low-interference conditions. With regard to accuracy,
the reverse interference index (non-recent negative –
recent negative) was calculated. Consequently, high scores
are indicative of considerable sensitivity to interference for
both RTs and accuracy.
First, in order to determine the age-related effect on
proactive and reactive cognitive control processes, two
repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on RTs and
accuracy scores comparing the two groups of participants,
with task condition (high or low interference level) as re-
peated measure factor. Planned contrasts were used to test
the effect of age in proactive and reactive control. Older
adults were expected to have more difficulties to manage
interference in the high-interference condition (reflecting
proactive control) than younger adults. However, no signifi-
cant difference was expected between the two groups in
the condition thought to favor the use of reactive control
strategy (low-interference condition). In addition, given that
a significant difference in educational level was evidenced
between young and older adults, the same repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs were conducted including educational level
as covariate.
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ferences in cognitive resources on the selective age-related
decline in proactive control, two statistical approaches
were used. First, repeated measures ANOVAs were con-
ducted on subgroups within the participant sample that
included young and older adults who were matched on
the basis of their performance on fluid intelligence and
processing speed tasks, respectively. Score ranges were de-
fined to create the largest subgroups of young and older
participants demonstrating similar performance in both
fluid intelligence and processing speed to avoid significant
differences between subsamples. With regard to the effect
of fluid intelligence level, 25 young adults and 25 older
adults with Raven scores between 48 and 53 were in-
cluded. Similarly, for processing speed, 25 young adults
(Code score between 61 and 89) and 29 older adults (Code
score between 61 and 93) were considered. The use of
matched groups for fluid intelligence abilities on one hand
and for processing speed on the other hand should pro-
vide a first evidence of the potential impact of cognitive
resources on the postulated specific age-related decline in
proactive control. Indeed, if the tendency to use proactive
control to deal with interference in high-interference con-
ditions is only sensitive to aging, differences should persist
in paired participants. However, if between-group differ-
ences disappeared, a potential impact of cognitive re-
sources might be suspected. Again, planned comparisons
were conducted between paired subgroups in the high-
and low-interference conditions to observe the potential
selectivity of the results in the high-interference condition
(reflecting proactive control). The effect size of each re-
peated measures ANOVA was reported as eta squared
(η2) for the main effects and interactions. Eta squared is
generally interpreted as the proportion of variance of the
dependent variable that is related to the factor.Table 3 Young and older adults groups’ performance on the
Young adults (n = 80)
High-interference condition Low-interference c
Recent negative
RTs 904.337 ± 212.009 879.987 ± 231.
Accuracy 0.933 ± 0.074 0.972 ± 0.06
Non-recent negative
RTs 777.925 ± 162.656 796.506 ± 174.
Accuracy 0.987 ± 0.027 0.982 ± 0.03
Recent positive
RTs 784.231 ± 153.083 781.775 ± 143.
Accuracy 0.959 ± 0.074 0.957 ± 0.04
Non-recent positive
RTs 809.244 ± 147.426 799.05 ± 157.7
Accuracy 0.911 ± 0.089 0.915 ± 0.08
Mean raw median RTs ± standard deviations.Traditionally, values of .01, .06, and .14 represent small,
medium and large effect sizes, respectively [46]. For
planned comparisons, the effect size was reported using
Cohen’s D (d) for which values of .2, .5, and .8 represent
small, medium and large effects, respectively.
Second, the privileged relationship that could exist be-
tween proactive control and cognitive resources was more
directly investigated in the whole sample of participants
with hierarchical linear regression analyses on the perform-
ance in the high-interference condition. Fluid intelligence
level and processing speed were considered as a “block” of
cognitive resources and were included simultaneously in
the analyses. In a first step, hierarchical linear regressions
were conducted to assess whether the age-related variance
in interference sensitivity in the high-interference condi-
tion remain significant after partialling out the percentage
of variance explained by cognitive resources. Afterwards,
hierarchical regression models were constructed to mea-
sure variance of performance in the high-interference con-
dition that might be explained by cognitive resources after
controlling for age-related variance.Selective age-related decline in proactive control
While only interference effects were reported in the present
work, for the sake of completeness, raw performance on
the whole task was reported in Table 3.
A 2 (group: young vs. older adults) × 2 (condition: high
vs. low interference level) repeated measures ANOVA
was performed on RTs (Figure 2A), and revealed signifi-
cant effects of age (F(1,158) = 8.3; p < .01; η2 = 0.05), with
greater sensitivity to interference in the older group; con-
dition (F(1,158) = 25.3; p < .001; η2 = 0.138), with smaller
interference indices in the low-interference condition; but
no significant age*condition interaction (F(1,158) = 2.1;probe recency task
Older adults (n = 80)
ondition High-interference condition Low-interference condition
631 1310.519 ± 346.285 1262.706 ± 317.558
9 0.912 ± 0.103 0.969 ± 0.083
007 1108.05 ± 276.049 1144.569 ± 264.464
2 0.976 ± 0.05 0.974 ± 0.039
168 1136.431 ± 314.061 1084.181 ± 230.038
7 0.948 ± 0.091 0.941 ± 0.06
34 1150.2 ± 280.182 1121.537 ± 246.568
6 0.886 ± 0.09 0.896 ± 0.091
Figure 2 Interference sensitivity in high (proactive) and low (reactive) interference conditions for young vs. older adults. (A) Mean
reaction times (ms); (B) Accuracy proportions. Error bars represent standard errors. *p < .05; **p < .001.
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sensitivity to interference for older than younger adults
in the high-interference condition (F(1,158) = 11.683;
p < .001; d = 0.54), while no group difference was found
in the low-interference condition (F(1,158) = 2.144;
p = .145; d = 0.22).
Concerning accuracy (Figure 2B), the 2 (group: young
vs. older adults) × 2 (condition: high vs. low interference
level) repeated measures ANOVA revealed only a sig-
nificant effect of condition (F(1,158) = 76.914; p < .001;
η2 = 0.33), with smaller interference indices in the
low-interference condition; but no significant age effect
(F(1,158) = 0.21; p = .651; η2 = 0.001) or age*condition
interaction (F(1,158) = 0.61; p = .436; η2 = 0.004). Planned
comparisons between young and older adults confirmed
the absence of age-related interference sensitivity in high
(proactive) (F(1,158) = 0.039; p = .844; d = 0.031) and low
(reactive) (F(1,158) = 0.792; p = .375; d = 0.142) interfer-
ence conditions.
Finally, two 2 (group: young vs. older adults) × 2 (con-
dition: high vs. low interference level) repeated measures
ANCOVAs were conducted with years of education as
covariate to discard the potential influence of educa-
tional level on RTs and accuracy performance. Concern-
ing RTs, no significant effect of the educational level was
found (F(1,157) = 0.00; p = .97; η2 < 0.001), the effect of
age (F(1,157) = 7.99; p < .05; η2 = 0.05) remained signifi-
cant and the age* condition interaction (F(1,157) = 2.48;
p = .12; η2 = 0.02) remained non-significant, while the
effect of condition disappeared (F(1,157) = 3.67; p = .057;
η2 = 0.02). With regard to accuracy data, the analysis re-
vealed a significant effect of educational level (F(1,157) =8.37; p < .05; η2 = 0.05). The other effects were not modi-
fied by adding the covariate: the age effect remained non-
significant (F(1,157) = 0.00; p = .99; η2 = 0), the condition
effect significant (F(1,157) = 17.31; p < .001; η2 = 0.1) and
the age*condition interaction non-significant (F(1,157) =
1.36; p = .25; η2 = 0.01).
In sum, the analyses of RTs revealed a selective age-
related decline in proactive control (high-interference
condition) whereas reactive control abilities seem to be
preserved. However, accuracy analyses evidenced a very
small number of errors in both high- and low-interference
conditions and did not show any effect of age on interfer-
ence sensitivity. Therefore, to improve our understanding
of cognitive control mechanisms and the effects of age on
these processes, it seems relevant to explore whether fluid
intelligence level and processing speed might influence
this age-related decrease in continuous management of
interference. Due to the absence of an age-related decline
in cognitive control in terms of accuracy, only RTs were
considered in the subsequent analyses.
Impact of fluid intelligence and processing speed on
cognitive control abilities in healthy aging
Concerning fluid intelligence level, a Student t test per-
formed on the entire participant sample (n = 160) revealed
a significant difference between young and older adults per-
formance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices (t(158) = 8.721;
p < .001), with the younger group performing better (see
Table 1), which confirms the presence of an age-related de-
cline in fluid intelligence. To examine the potential influ-
ence of fluid intelligence on proactive control abilities in
aging, subgroups were formed within the participant
Manard et al. BMC Neuroscience 2014, 15:7 Page 9 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/15/7sample. As described above, 25 young (M age = 21.64; SD
= 3.289) and 25 older adults (M age = 73.8; SD = 7.047)
with scores between 48 and 53 on the Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices test were selected (see Table 4). As ex-
pected, the performance of these subsamples of young and
older participants was similar (t(48) = 0.606; p = .547).
Concerning processing speed, a Student t test conducted
on the whole participant sample revealed a significant dif-
ference between young and older adults (t(158) = 13.322;
p < .001). As Table 1 shows, young adults performed sig-
nificantly better than older adults on the Code task, con-
firming the postulated age-related decline in processing
speed. To determine the influence of processing speed
on the age-related decline in proactive control abilities,
two subgroups of 25 young adults with a score on the
Code test between 61 and 89 (M age = 21.96; SD = 2.406)
and 29 older adults with a score between 61 and 93
(M age = 70.724; SD = 7.643) were created (see Table 4).
Again, the difference in performance between these sub-
groups became non-significant (t(52) = 1.651; p = .105).
Separate ANOVAs were performed on the subgroups
matched for fluid intelligence level and processing speed.
Due to the similar level of performance between young
and older participants on these factors, the analyses were
conducted to investigate whether the proactive control
decline evidenced in our first analysis can be considered
as a specific effect of aging or influenced by a decrease
in fluid intelligence and/or processing speed. Indeed, in
the case of a specific effect of aging, the age-related dif-
ference in proactive control should remain significant.
However, this difference was expected to disappear if it
was influenced by a decrease in fluid intelligence and/or
processing speed.
Influence of fluid intelligence on the age-related decline
in proactive control
A 2 (paired subgroup: young vs. older adults) × 2 (condi-
tion: high vs. low interference level) repeated measures
ANOVA was performed to investigate the potential influ-
ence of fluid intelligence on the selective age-related decline
in proactive control (Table 5 and Figure 3). The analysis
of RTs revealed no significant effect of age (F(1,48) = 0.00;
p = .957; η2 = 0.00006), suggesting no significant differ-
ence in interference sensitivity between young and older
adults who have similar fluid intelligence level. No sig-
nificant effect of condition was found (F(1,48) = 2.87;
p = .097; η2 = 0.056), suggesting no significant difference in
interference sensitivity between high and low-interference
conditions. Finally, no significant age*condition inter-
action (F(1,48) = 0.03; p = .861; η2 = 0.0006) was re-
vealed, suggesting that young and older adults did not
differ in sensitivity to interference in proactive and re-
active control conditions. These results were confirmed
by planned comparisons that showed no significantdifference in interference sensitivity in the two groups
both in the high (F(1,48) = 0.005; p = .944; d = 0.014)
and low (F(1,48) = 0.017; p = .897; d = 0.041) interference
conditions.Influence of processing speed on the age-related decline
in proactive control
A 2 (paired subgroup: young vs. older adults) × 2 (condi-
tion: high vs. low interference level) repeated measures
ANOVA was performed to investigate the potential influ-
ence of processing speed on the selective age-related de-
cline in proactive control (Table 6 and Figure 4). The RTs
analysis revealed no significant effect of age (F(1,52) = 2.11;
p = .152; η2 = 0.039), suggesting no significant differ-
ence in interference sensitivity between young and older
adults. A significant effect of condition (F(1,52) = 11.66;
p < .05; η2 = 0.183), with smaller interference indices in
the low-interference condition, was found. Finally, no sig-
nificant age*condition interaction (F(1,52) = 0.17; p = .686;
η2 = 0.003) was evidenced, suggesting that young and
older adults did not differ in interference sensitivity across
the two conditions (high- and low-interference). Moreover,
planned comparisons confirmed that young and older
adults did not differ in interference sensitivity in both high
(F(1,52) = 2.544; p = .117; d = 0.438) and low (F(1,52) =
0.756; p = .388; d = 0.243) interference conditions.Hierarchical linear regressions
In order to more directly test the influence of cognitive
resources (fluid intelligence and processing speed) on
the observed age-related decline in proactive control, two
hierarchical linear regression analyses were performed on
RTs in the high-interference condition. For these analyses,
fluid intelligence and processing speed performance were
not collapsed in a composite score because they were only
moderately correlated (r < .70 as preconized by Hair,
Black, Babin, & Anderson [47]) (r = .48 in the young
adults group and r = .39 in the older adults group), but
were simultaneously entered in the same block of predic-
tors to assess the “cognitive resources” influence on age-
related proactive control performance.
First, hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess
whether the age-related variance in interference sensitiv-
ity in the high-interference condition remain significant
after controlling for variance explained by cognitive re-
sources (Models A). Results are summarized in Table 7A.
The model 1A provides a simple linear regression asses-
sing the amount of variance in the high-interference
condition that could be attributed to age. In order to
verify whether the contribution of age might be reduced
to a non-significant account after controlling for cogni-
tive resources-related variance in the high-interference
condition, the model 2A includes fluid intelligence and















Young adults (n = 25) 14/11 21.64 ± 3.29 12.72 ± 2.07 19.56 ± 5.07 50.6 ± 1.78 79.52 ± 9.46
Older adults (n = 25) 13/12 73.8 ± 7.05 15.04 ± 3.67 29.56 ± 2.52 50.32 ± 1.6 63.56 ± 9.93 141.92 ± 2.29
Student t tests between young and older adults t(48) = −2.753* t(48) = −8.998** t(48) = 0.606 t(48) = 5.775**
Processing speed
matching
Young adults (n = 25) 14/11 21.96 ± 2.41 13.08 ± 2.39 20.52 ± 4.96 50.12 ± 5.44 74.64 ± 7.47
Older adults (n = 29) 12/17 70.72 ± 7.64 14.10 ± 2.69 28.86 ± 3.04 45.97 ± 7.81 71.07 ± 8.15 141.79 ± 2.31
Student t tests between young and older adults t(52) = −1.465 t(52) = −7.777** t(52) = 2.208* t(52) = 1.651
Mean raw scores ± standard deviations *p <.05; ** p <.001.




















Table 5 Probe Recency Task performance (RTs) for fluid intelligence subgroups
Young adults (n = 25) Older adults (n = 25)
High-interference condition Low-interference condition High-interference condition Low-interference condition
Recent negative 950.02 ± 206.812 946.48 ± 226.763 1145.5 ± 204.028 1151.4 ± 266.354
Non-recent negative 819.18 ± 173.024 840.44 ± 192.809 1008.7 ± 171.459 1046.36 ± 202.262
Recent positive 833.5 ± 171.849 803.64 ± 135.751 1076.56 ± 269.702 991.66 ± 156.991
Non-recent positive 849.56 ± 170.973 814.86 ± 161.804 1070.74 ± 160.817 1035.88 ± 217.716
Mean raw median RTs ± standard deviations.
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predictor.
Model 1A revealed that age significantly explained
6.9% of the variance in the high-interference condition
(F(1,158) = 11.684; p < .001). In the second model (2A), the
age-related variance became non significant (ΔF(1,156) =
1.638; p = .202) after controlling for cognitive resources
(ΔF(2,157) = 8.478; p < 0.001). Following Baudouin et al.’s
procedurea [48], cognitive resources accounted for 86.95%
of the age-related variance of interference management in
the high-interference condition.
Second, hierarchical regression models were constructed
to assess variance of performance in the high-interference
condition that might be explained by cognitive resources
after controlling for age-related influence (Models B). Re-
sults are summarized in Table 7B. The first model (1B),
providing a simple linear regression to assess the amount
of variance in the high-interference condition that could
be attributed to cognitive resources, revealed a significant
explained variance of 9.7% (F(2,157) = 8.478; p < .001). In
order to verify whether the contribution of cognitiveFigure 3 Interference sensitivity in high (proactive) and low (reactive)
fluid intelligence level. Mean reaction times (ms); Error bars represent staresources might be reduced to a non-significant account
after controlling for age-related variance in the high de-
manding condition, the model 2B was constructed using
age groups as first predictor and cognitive resources as
second predictor. This second model confirmed that cog-
nitive resources (ΔF(2,156) = 3.319; p < .05) added a sig-
nificant explained variance to the interference sensitivity in
the high-interference condition, once age-related variance
(ΔF(1,158) = 11.684; p < .01) had been controlled. Finally,
following the same procedure as before [48], the age
groups accounted for 60.82% of the cognitive resources
variance.Discussion
This study was designed to investigate, in the context of
the DMC model [20], the age-related decline in cognitive
control and particularly the decreased tendency to use
proactive control strategies in high-interference conditions
with aging. More specifically, we were interested in deter-
mining whether performance on general cognitive abilitiesinterference conditions for young vs. older adults with similar
ndard errors. *p < .05; **p < .001.
Table 6 Probe Recency Task performance (RTs) for processing speed subgroups
Young adults (n = 25) Older adults (n = 29)
High-Interference condition Low-Interference condition High-Interference condition Low-Interference condition
Recent negative 907.28 ± 184.188 874.64 ± 206.275 1168.724 ± 263.362 1130.138 ± 294.32
Non-recent negative 781.08 ± 145.053 798.18 ± 160.469 984.293 ± 204.173 1015.069 ± 220.5
Recent positive 829.28 ± 194.105 792.22 ± 141.983 1020.069 ± 241.048 968.466 ± 193.416
Non-recent positive 845.32 ± 154.266 810.7 ± 147.945 1030.552 ± 184.817 1014.862 ± 235.801
Mean raw median RTs ± standard deviations.
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ence the selective age-related decline in proactive control.
The present study replicates previous findings [14,38,39]
indicative of a selective age-related decline in proactive con-
trol, in association with preserved reactive control abilities.
Indeed, greater sensitivity to interference was observed for
older than younger adults in the high-interference condi-
tion of the Sternberg task, which is thought to favor pro-
active control, but not in the low-interference condition,
which is postulated to involve reactive control processes.
Therefore, the presence of greater sensitivity to interference
(in comparison to young subjects) in a context involving a
large number of interfering trials seems to indicate that
older adults did not try to anticipate the occurrence of
interfering items but rather tended to react following the
presentation of these items [[14,38,39], for similar results
and interpretation].
Conflict monitoring [11] and executive attention [13]
theories stress the importance of active maintenance of
goal-relevant information to achieve a task, particularly
during high-interference situations. In line with theseFigure 4 Interference sensitivity in high (proactive) and low (reactive)
processing speed. Mean reaction times (ms); Error bars represent standardtheories, the observed selective impairment of proactive
control processes might be interpreted as a failure to
maintain task-goal representations in a high-interference
context see also [39] or, more generally, as a deficit affect-
ing general context representations, including task-relevant
information that could influence cognitive processes in-
volved in the task [14]. In addition, similarly to the study
conducted by Bélanger, Belleville and Gauthier [3], our
results revealed an increase in age-related interference
sensitivity in high-interference situations but particu-
larly for RTs and not for accuracy of responses. There-
fore, age seems to partially affect the ability to maintain
task-goal information, since older adults were slowed
down by the goal-maintenance requirement but they
were still able to succeed on the trials.
In addition, one important goal of this study was to
determine whether the decrease in proactive control
abilities in healthy aging is related to fluid intelligence level
and processing speed, two general cognitive processes
known to be affected by age e.g., [49-54]. For instance,
Li et al. [51] observed an age-related decline in fluidinterference conditions for young vs. older adults with similar
errors. *p < .05; **p < .001.
Table 7 Results from hierarchical linear regressions
A Model Step Predictors R2 Adjusted R2 SE ΔR2 ΔF p β





0.097 0.086 0.048 0.097 8.478 0.000
−0.247
0.03
2 Age groups 0.107 0.09 0.048 0.009 1.638 0.202 0.143





0.097 0.086 0.048 0.097 8.478 0.000
−0.27
−0.059





0.107 0.09 0.048 0.038 3.319 0.039
−0.247
0.03
A) Results from the hierarchical linear regressions performed on the high-interference condition to investigate the age-related influence on interference sensitivity
after controlling for cognitive resources. B) Results from the hierarchical linear regressions performed on the high-interference condition to investigate the
cognitive resources-related influence on interference sensitivity after controlling for age.
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chometric tasks used in the Berlin Aging Study [50,55])
from 40 years old. Decreased ability to efficiently man-
age conflict costs was also observed from the age of 50
using a flanker task. Interestingly, these authors also re-
vealed a significant relationship between fluid intelligence
and conflict costs for their older adults group while no
significant influence appeared for younger adults, suggest-
ing that the decline in cognitive resources abilities could
impede the tendency to implement the most efficient
strategy to perform a task.
Moreover, within the DMC background, the tendency
to use proactive control was previously related to the
ease or efficacy of active goal maintenance in working
memory [13,21,56]. Thus, due to the interrelations be-
tween working memory and fluid intelligence/processing
speed [27,29,49,57], it seemed relevant to predict an in-
fluence of these cognitive resources on proactive control
abilities. With regard to fluid intelligence, Burgess and
Braver [7] observed that participants with high fluid in-
telligence were less sensitive to interference than partici-
pants with low fluid intelligence in the high-interference
condition, in which proactive control is assumed to be
involved. With the same kind of task, results obtained
in the present study suggest that, when older and youn-
ger adults are equated for their level of fluid intelligence,
the age effect on the use of proactive control in high-
interference condition disappeared. Therefore, the current
results are consistent with Burgess and Braver’s [7] earlier
findings and extend the evidence to healthy aging, suggest-
ing that fluid intelligence could influence how proactive
and reactive cognitive control processes are implemented
according to task requirements in both young and older
adults.
Given the age-related decline in processing speed [58]
and its influence on working memory abilities [53,59],this study also investigated the potential influence of this
factor on the age-related decline in proactive control.
Similarly to fluid intelligence, processing speed seems to
be involved in the tendency to anticipate in a sustained
manner the interfering items in a high-interference con-
text. Indeed, when younger and older participants were
selected according to their performance on a basic pro-
cessing speed task, the previously observed selective age-
related difference in proactive control disappeared.
In addition, hierarchical linear regression analyses were
conducted on RTs to more directly assess the influence of
cognitive resources on proactive control abilities. These
analyses supported the assumption of an influence of age-
related decline in cognitive resources (assessed here simul-
taneously by fluid intelligence and processing speed) on
the tendency to use proactive control strategies in a high-
interference condition. Indeed, the results of a first ana-
lysis suggest that age explains a significant amount of
interference sensitivity variance in the high-interference
condition, assumed to favor proactive control. Moreover,
this analysis also indicates that cognitive resources ac-
count for a large portion of that age-related variance in
proactive control. Finally, models including age groups in
a first step, followed by cognitive resources, suggested that
cognitive resources add explained variance to interference
sensitivity in the high-interference condition, which is not
captured by age-related variance.
Limitations
It should be noted that the present study provided an unex-
pected effect of condition. Indeed, contrary to the predic-
tion of Braver, Gray and Burgess [20], the high-interference
condition seems more difficult for young and older partici-
pants. Even if the reason is not clear, since few studies have
used the Sternberg paradigm to explore proactive and re-
active control processes, this unexpected pattern of results
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in cognitive control because we systematically compared
the performance of young and older participants in each
condition separately. It seems interesting to note that this
pattern of response was not influenced by a more liberal
response bias in the high- than in the low- interference
condition. Indeed, C indices were calculated according
to the signal detection theory [60] and revealed a signifi-
cant tendency for “yes” responses that did not differ across
age-groups or across control conditions. Moreover, partic-
ipants that did not show the expected effect in the high-
interference condition did not differ on demographic
(years of education) or on neuropsychological variables
(fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, or processing
speed). Therefore, cognitive resources factors that may in-
fluence cognitive control need further investigation if we
want to better understand the variability observed in
healthy populations.
Brain imaging data could be very valuable in investigat-
ing the implementation of proactive and reactive control
strategies in healthy aging according to the availability of
cognitive resources. For instance, the DMC model [20]
distinguished two specific patterns of cerebral activity de-
pending on the use of proactive or reactive control strat-
egy. Proactive control was associated with phasic activity
in the lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas reactive control
involved transient activation, particularly in the anterior
cingulate cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex and medial tem-
poral lobe. In accordance with these predictions, Burgess
and Braver [7] observed in young subjects transient in-
creased activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex during the
probe period when interference expectancy was low; but
sustained bilateral prefrontal cortex activity during the
delay period in situations of high expectation of interfer-
ence. Moreover, the high fluid intelligence group demon-
strated increased activation of right lateral prefrontal
regions prior to the presentation of the probe (suggesting
a proactive control strategy) compared to the low fluid
intelligence group, which seemed to preferentially imple-
ment reactive control strategies (i.e., probe-triggered acti-
vation on interference trials). In addition, Braver et al. [20]
proposed that the observed shift from proactive control to
reactive control in aging was also supported by changes in
brain activation and neurotransmission patterns, particu-
larly in the prefrontal cortex and in the dopamine system,
respectively. Therefore, it seems relevant to hypothesize
that age-related prefrontal atrophy and/or intra-cerebral
dopamine levels decrease might influence the efficiency in
implementing proactive control processes leading to a pat-
tern of brain activity reflecting the involvement of reactive
control [see [39] for such a pattern of results using the
AX-CPT task].
At this time, few studies explored the neural substrates
of cognitive control in young subjects [7,61-64] and thesestudies used various protocols (e.g., Sternberg, Stroop and
N-back tasks). Some discrepancies in the neural substrates
associated to proactive and reactive control were observed
according to the exact characteristics of the tasks (e.g.
more or less initial requirement of reactive vs. proactive
control) and explored populations (e.g., varying by the
level of dopamine availability). However, the adaptation of
these paradigms to aging populations should add a sub-
stantial value to the comprehension of the implementation
of proactive and reactive control processes, as well as to
the influence of available cognitive resources. In particular,
such studies would improve the understanding of the cog-
nitive factors that could exert an influence on the selective
age-related decline in the ability to use proactive control
in a high demanding environment.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study suggests that the age-related de-
cline in the tendency to use efficiently the proactive control
strategy is at least partially modulated by fluid intelligence
level and processing speed abilities. Consequently, the abil-
ity to appropriately use cognitive control processes during
aging seems to be related to the amount of available cog-
nitive resources. Therefore, it could be suggested that lim-
iting the decline in fluid intelligence and/or processing
speed could improve the ability of healthy older adults to
optimally cope with interference in high-demanding situa-
tions. For example, future studies could evaluate the po-
tential benefit of specific cognitive resources training
programs on the effective use of proactive control abilities
in aging. Another interesting line of research could be the
investigation of personality factors in older adults that
might influence the tendency to adapt strategies according
to the task context e.g. [65,66]. More generally, the present
study emphasizes the importance of taking into account
available cognitive resources during cognitive control
assessment in healthy as well as pathological populations
(e.g. schizophrenia or neurodegenerative diseases).
Endnote
aAccording to these authors [48], the percentage of cog-
nitive resources – related variance that accounted for the
age effect can be calculated by the formulae: [ΔR2regressor
from model 1 (simple model) – ΔR2regressor from model
2 (hierarchical model)/(ΔR2regressor from model 1)*100].
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